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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950062-CA 
v. : 
GORDON RAY HAM : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Gordon Ray Ham appeals his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to 
distribute pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994) 
(R. 81), a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-
37-4(2) (b) (i) (D) (1994) and 58-37-8(1) (b) (i) (1994). This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the probation officers' initial search 
for alcohol? In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 -(Utah 1993), the 
Supreme Court held that a trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
a consent to search was voluntary constitutes a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Id. at 1271. However, the appellate 
courts should accord the determination some deference. State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938-41 (Utah 1994). 
2. Where the probation officers stated they intended to 
look for alcohol in the refrigerator and defendant did not object 
to them looking in the freezer next to the refrigerator, did the 
trial court properly conclude that defendant's consent to look 
for alcohol in the refrigerator implicitly included consent to 
look for alcohol in the freezer? Whether a consent search 
exceeds the scope of the consent is a question of fact reviewed 
for clear error only. State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
3. If the initial search was illegal, did defendant 
nevertheless voluntarily consent to the subsequent search that 
led to the cocaine on which his conviction was based? The trial 
court did not deny the motion to suppress on this basis; 
therefore, there is no trial court finding to review. However, 
this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper 
basis. State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1994)# a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2) (b) (i) (D) (1994) and 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) (1994), and 
with possession of psilocybin mushrooms in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), a third degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (T) (1994) and 58-37-
8(2) (b) (ii) (1994) (R. 7-8). After the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, defendant conditionally 
pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 
and the court, on the State's motion, dismissed the possession 
charge (R. 67-68, 75). 
On January 23, 1995, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
the statutory prison term of one to fifteen years and imposed a 
$4,625 fine (R. 81). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 13, 1994, probation officers Scott McCullough and 
Craig Hillam visited defendant, a probationer, on a routine home 
visit to assure defendant's compliance with his probation 
conditions (R. 37, 86, 119, 156). Defendant's probation 
3 
agreement proscribed him from possessing alcohol and from 
illegally using or distributing controlled substances (R. 37). 
At defendant's home, a woman answered the door and told the 
probation officers defendant was in the basement (R. 121). The 
probation officers waited either on the porch or just inside the 
front door for defendant to come upstairs (R. 141). 
When defendant came upstairs, McCullough asked whether 
defendant was having any problems (R. 123). McCullough then 
"stated words to the effect 'We need to look in the refrigerator 
for alcohol'" (R. 86), or "We need to look in the fridge for 
alcohol, okay?" (R. 142), or that he wanted to make an alcohol 
check, is that okay? (R. 169). *[D]efendant replied words to the 
effect "Go ahead' (in any event the defendant did not state any 
objection)" (R. 86). 
The probation officers then went into the kitchen. 
McCullough checked in the refrigerator and found no alcohol (R. 
86, 125, 158). Hillam looked in the freezer, located one step 
away from the refrigerator, where he found two bottles of alcohol 
(R. 86, 125, 158-59). Defendant did not object to Hillam looking 
in the freezer (R. 56). McCullough poured the confiscated 
alcohol down the drain and told defendant that possessing the 
alcohol violated his probation (R. 125-26). 
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The probation officers then instructed defendant to escort 
them on a cursory search through the house (R. 86, 126). 
Defendant did not object and led the probation officers through 
the house, opening doors and explaining what each room was (R. 
126, 146). During this walk-through, the probation officers Mid 
not take any time to look through stuff in the upstairs" (R. 
146) . 
Defendant led the probation officers into the basement, 
where they found fourteen cans of beer in a cooler (R. 86, 127, 
161). While McCullough spoke to defendant about the additional 
beer, Hillam checked in a back room in the basement, where he 
found in plain view a framed mirror with a white substance on it, 
razor blades, and devices that could be used for "snorting coke" 
(R. 86, 161-62). There was enough residue on the mirror to 
provide two "snorts" (R. 163) . 
When Hillam returned from the room, he arrested and 
handcuffed defendant (R. 86, 128, 163). Hillam asked defendant 
about additional drugs (R. 86). Defendant told the probation 
officers he had psilocybin mushrooms in the house, confirmed that 
the white powder on the mirror was cocaine, and admitted that the 
cocaine belonged to him (R. 86-87, 128, 163-64)• 
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While waiting for back-up police officers to arrive, Hillam 
gave defendant his Miranda warnings, asked defendant whether 
there were anymore drugs in the house, and told him they would 
search the house anyway (R. 129). Defendant told the probation 
officers about a trunk in a closet under the stairs and gave the 
closet key to the probation officers (R. 87, 129-30, 148-49). 
The probation officers found the largest quantity of cocaine in 
that trunk (R. 130). 
Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized, 
including the cocaine found under the stairs (R. 19-20). The 
trial judge denied the motion (R. 58, 87-88), finding: (1) 
defendant consented to the officers' initial search of the 
refrigerator; (2) defendant's consent implicitly included 
searching the freezer next to the refrigerator; and (3) 
discovering the alcohol in the freezer gave the officers 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a more intrusive 
search of defendant's home (R. 87). The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are attached as addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Voluntariness of consent. Under the totality of the 
circumstances of this case, defendant voluntarily consented to 
the initial search of the refrigerator and freezer, which 
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resulted in the seizure of the alcohol. Defendant gave the 
consent while in his own home and before he was in custody. The 
officers waited at defendant's front door until someone answered 
it# waited either on the porch or just inside the front door for 
defendant to come up from the basement, and made no show of 
force. Although defendant disputed that he actually consented, 
both officers testified that he responded affirmatively to their 
search request. In light of these circumstances, the trial court 
correctly concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search. 
2. Scope of consent. The trial court correctly concluded 
that defendant's consent to search the refrigerator for alcohol 
included searching the nearby freezer. Although a separate 
appliance, the officers informed defendant that alcohol was the 
object of the search and both appliances could be used to chill 
alcohol. Furthermore, defendant did not object when Hillam 
opened the freezer door to look inside. 
3. Attenuation of second consent. Alternatively, if some 
deficiency exists in the initial consent, defendant's second 
consent to search the closet under the stairs supports the trial 
court's refusal to suppress the cocaine found in the closet. 
Defendant voluntarily consented to searching the closet by 
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informing Hillam that there was cocaine in the closet then giving 
Hillam the keys to the closet. The second consent was also 
sufficiently attenuated from any prior illegality. Although 
close in time and circumstance, no flagrant constitutional 
violation preceded the second consent. To the contrary, the 
probation officers believed they had satisfied all constitutional 
requirements to conduct the initial search; therefore, 
suppressing the evidence would provide little deterrence benefit 
while robbing the State of critical evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
A probationer has a diminished privacy interest under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, 
the probation officers could constitutionally search defendant's 
residence once they had reasonable suspicion to believe that he 
had violated his probation or that he had committed some other 
offense. State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983), 
State v. Martinez/ e n P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant correctly argues that the State cannot rely on 
reasonable suspicion of a probation violation to justify the 
search of defendant's freezer. Appellant's Brief at 11-14. Both 
probation officers testified they did not suspect that defendant 
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had violated any probation condition until they discovered 
alcohol in his freezer, and that they based their search of the 
refrigerator and the freezer on defendant's consent (R. 119, 122-
25, 157-58). The trial court's finding is consistent with this 
testimony (R. 87). 
On the other hand, once the probation officers found the 
alcohol in defendant's freezer, they had sufficient reasonable 
suspicion to justify the more extensive search that ultimately 
led to the cocaine, psilocybin mushrooms, and drug paraphernalia. 
Defendant does not dispute this point, arguing only the 
constitutional infirmity of the freezer search. Therefore, the 
trial court properly refused to suppress the cocaine if defendant 
gave the probation officers a constitutionally effective consent 
to search the freezer or if defendant's subsequent consent to 
search under the stairs cured any defect in the initial consent. 
POINT I 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS 
REFRIGERATOR AND FREEZER 
The trial court concluded that defendant consented to the 
probation officers searching his refrigerator and, by 
implication, his freezer (R. 87). On appeal, defendant argues 
that the record fails to establish a clear and unequivocal 
9 
consent.1 However, defendant's argument ignores most of the 
circumstances and testimony supporting the trial court's 
conclusion. In light of the totality of the circumstances, the 
trial court correctly concluded that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the initial search for alcohol. 
A. Standard of review. 
In State Vt Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court's ultimate voluntariness 
conclusion constitutes a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Id. at 1271. However, in Thurman. the court 
considered only two possibilities: whether the determination 
constituted a question of fact reviewed for clear error or a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Id. at 1268-69. 
Since Thurman. the supreme court has de-polarized its 
articulation of the standards for reviewing how a trial court 
Although the trial court did not make a specific finding on 
voluntariness (R. 85-88), it did find that defendant consented to 
the initial search and denied his motion to suppress (R. 87). 
The lack of a specific voluntariness finding may be explained by 
defendant's failure to frame his argument as specifically 
challenging the voluntariness. Instead, defendant claimed that 
he did not clearly and unequivocally consent to the search (R. 
21-27). The trial court's rejection of this argument amounts to 
a finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search 
because defendant's claim implicates the voluntariness analysis. 
£££, e.g.. State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied. 836 p.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
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applies a legal principle to the facts a specific case. In State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the court recognized that 
appellate courts should often give trial courts some discretion 
when applying a rule of law to the facts before it. ?d. at 936-
37. The court described the degrees of discretion as a spectrum: 
at one end, trial court's have broad discretion in applying the 
rule to the facts, and at the other, only narrow discretion. Id. 
at 938. Although the court cited to Thurman as an example of the 
kinds of issues at the narrow end, it also granted trial courts a 
^measure of discretion" in determining whether reasonable 
suspicion justifies a warrantless search and whether a defendant 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because both determinations 
depend heavily on the particular facts before the trial court. 
Id-, at 938-41. 
Because a determination of voluntary consent to a search 
also depends heavily on the unique facts of each case, the 
appellate courts should give trial courts *a measure of 
discretion" in making that determination. Cf. id.2 in any 
event, the trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily 
2Pena identifies fact sensitivity of a particular issue as 
generally requiring giving trial court's at least some discretion 
in applying legal principles to the facts before them. Id. at 
939. 
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consented withstands appellate scrutiny even under the stricter 
correctness standard. 
B. The trial court correctly concluded that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the initial search-
Whether defendant voluntarily consented nis a fact sensitive 
issue to be determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances." State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). The State meets 
its burden to establish voluntariness if it satisfies the 
following standard: 
11
 (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely 
and intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived." 
Id. (citations omitted). The following factors provide guidance 
in determining whether the probation officers coerced the 
consent: "'1) absence of a claim of authority to search by the 
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner...; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer.'" liL. at 467-68 (quoting State V, Wftittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)). 
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The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have found that other 
defendants voluntarily consented under circumstances that suggest 
at least some coerciveness. For example, both courts have upheld 
the voluntariness of consents to search even though the suspect 
was under arrest and in custody. See, e.g.. State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 1217-19 (Utah 1993); State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273-74 (Utah App. 1990). In State v. Dunn, the supreme court 
found the defendant's consent to search his duffle bag voluntary 
even though defendant based his consent on his need for 
medication in the bag. Similarly, in State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 
82-83(Utah App. 1990), this Court found that Webb's girlfriend 
voluntarily consented to the search even though officers 
initially arrived at the home with weapons drawn, she had her 
infant son in the home with her, she was handcuffed and initially 
made to kneel on the living room floor, and she was under arrest. 
IiL. at 82-83. see also State v. Thurman, 846 p.2d 1256, 1273 
(Utah 1993) (Thurman's second consent voluntary even though he 
had been in custody and shackled for six hours prior to giving 
it) . 
The overall circumstances under which defendant gave his 
consent were far less coercive than those in the cases described 
above. The probation officers went to defendant's home for one 
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of many routine probation checks, waited for someone to answer 
the door, asked for defendant, and waited either on the porch or 
just inside the front door for defendant to come upstairs rather 
than go looking for defendant (R. 121, 141, 144) . Defendant 
cooperated fully with the probation officers and did not object 
or even hesitate when he agreed to let the probation officers 
check for alcohol (R. 124). Defendant was in the relative 
comfort of his own home and was not under arrest or physically 
restrained. The probation officers did not represent that they 
had a warrant to search, did not show any force, and did not 
attempt to deceive defendant. Based on this record, the trial 
court correctly concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to 
the alcohol check. 
Defendant argues that because McCullough could not recall 
defendant's specific response to his request to check for 
alcohol, the State has not established an unequivocal and 
specific consent. Appellant's Brief at 15-17. Defendant ignores 
the trial court's factual finding that defendant responded to the 
search request, *Go ahead," or words to that effect (R. 86), and 
this record establishes that the trial court did not clearly err 
in making that finding. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1271 
(underlying factual determinations reviewed for clear error). 
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Although neither officer could remember verbatim defendant's 
response, McCullough testified that he believed defendant said 
"go ahead" (R. 123), and Hillam testified that defendant 
responded affirmatively to the search request (R. 158). 
Responding to a search request with "go ahead" or any similar 
phrase establishes a clear and unequivocal consent. Defendant 
cites no case authority to the contrary. 
Defendant also claims that he did not consent at all; 
rather, the probation officers told him that they would search 
and he merely failed to resist.3 Appellant's Brief at 16-21. 
Whether defendant actually consented constitutes a question of 
fact reviewed for clear error. State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4, 8 
(Utah 1994). At the suppression hearing, defendant testified 
that he never gave the probation officers permission to search 
(R. 173-74). By contrast, McCullough testified that he asked 
defendant, "We need to look in the fridge for alcohol, okay?" (R. 
142), and Hillam testified that McCullough said that he wanted to 
make an alcohol check, is that okay? (R. 169). Both testified 
that defendant responded affirmatively. The trial court was 
defendant also makes this assertion in support of his 
argument that suppression provides the only appropriate remedy in 
this case. Id. The State has not asked for any substitute 
remedy. 
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entitled to and apparently did discredit defendant's testimony, 
finding that he actually gave his consent to the search. Id. 
(wxit is the prerogative of the trial court to evaluate the 
evidence and choose what testimony to believe'")(citation 
omitted). Defendant has not established any clear error in the 
trial court's finding. Id. 
Based on the above, the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the initial search. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SCOPE OF 
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH THE REFRIGERATOR INCLUDED LOOKING 
IN THE FREEZER 
The trial court found that defendant's consent to search the 
refrigerator for alcohol implicitly included consent to search 
the freezer (R. 87). Although a separate appliance from the 
refrigerator, the freezer was located in the same room only "one 
step away" from the refrigerator (R. 125). Defendant challenges 
this finding. 
Whether a search remains within the scope of the consent 
given is a factual question reviewed for clear error only, state 
V. GrpVier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App. 1991). See also. United 
States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855# 858 (8th cir. 1993); 
United States v, Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th cir. 1990), 
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cert, denied. 501 U.S. 1207 (1991) .4 "The standard for measuring 
the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is 
that of *objective' reasonableness -- what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the 
officer and the suspect." Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 251 
(1991); State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 1992). 
The object of the search generally defines its scope. Jimeno at 
251. 
In Jimeno. the United States Supreme Court held that consent 
to search an automobile included consent to search containers in 
the automobile that might contain narcotics because the officer 
identified narcotics as the object of the search. The Court held 
that *[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that 
narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container." 
Id* 
In this case, a reasonable person would conclude that the 
consent to search the refrigerator included consent to search the 
freezer. Although separate appliances, they were next to each 
4This Court decided Grovier before the supreme court decided 
Thurman and Pena. and no subsequent cases from either this Court 
or the Utah Supreme Court have stated a different standard of 
review. However, even applying a less deferential standard of 
review, the Court should still affirm the trial court's finding 
that the search remained within the scope of defendant's consent. 
17 
other in the kitchen. McCullough informed defendant that the 
object of his search was alcohol; a reasonable person would know 
that both the refrigerator and the freezer could be used to chill 
alcohol.5 A reasonable person would also expect a consent to 
search a refrigerator to include consent to search the 
refrigerator's freezer unit. That the freezer was a separate 
appliance in this case should not lead to a contrary result. 
Moreover, defendant did not object when Hillam walked over 
to the freezer and opened it (R. 56). This also supports the 
trial court's finding that defendant understood his consent to 
include the freezer. £££, e.g./ United States Y. Martel-
Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1993) (consent to search 
vehicle included consent to punch hole in sheet metal where 
defendant observed police preparing to do so and did not object); 
United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1501 doth cir. 1991) 
(consent to search glove box, trunk, and remainder of vehicle 
included cleft between the rear seat cushions because defendant 
acquiesced to searching their), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1118 
(1992); United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514-15 (10th Cir. 
5The freezer was not cold enough to freeze the alcohol: the 
officers poured the alcohol down the drain even though defendant 
claimed the alcohol had been in the freezer for some time (R. 
159) . 
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1990) (consent to look inside the vehicle included looking under 
an outside vent in the rear quarter panel where defendant walked 
away from the vehicle and expressed no objection when the officer 
was examining the rear quarter panel), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 
1207 (1991) . 
Based on these facts, the trial court correctly concluded 
that defendant's consent extended to the freezer. 
PQINT III 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S SUBSEQUENT VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
TO SEARCH UNDER THE STAIRS FOR COCAINE PROVIDES AN 
INDEPENDENT BASIS TO AFFIRM HIS CONVICTION 
In the alternative, even if this Court concludes that some 
problem exists with defendant's consent to the initial search of 
his refrigerator and freezer, defendant subsequently consented to 
the search of the closet under the stairs that led to the cocaine 
on which his conviction is based. Because that consent was 
voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from any prior illegality, 
it provides an independent basis to admit the cocaine. 
After arresting defendant and advising him of his Miranda 
rights, Hillam asked him about other drugs in the house (R. 129). 
In response, defendant informed the probation officers about the 
cocaine in the closet under the stairs and gave them the key to 
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the closet (R. 129-30, 148-49). The probation officers found the 
largest quantity of cocaine in that closet. 
In order to remove the taint of any prior illegality, the 
second consent must be: (1) voluntary; and (2) sufficiently 
attenuated from the prior illegality so that excluding the 
evidence would have no deterrent effect. State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993). The voluntariness analysis is the 
same regardless of any prior illegality. Id. at 1262. Defendant 
voluntarily consented to searching the closet under the stairs. 
When asked about additional drugs, defendant told the probation 
officers about the cocaine in the closet and gave them the keys 
to the closet. Although defendant was under arrest and 
handcuffed, that alone does not render his consent involuntary. 
State yt Webb, 790 p.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990); State Vt Bofrp, 
803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah App. 1990). Defendant was still in 
the relative comfort of his own home, seated on a bed in the 
basement. Bobo. 803 P.2d at 1274. There is no evidence the 
probation officers threatened defendant's well-being. Webb. 790 
P.2d at 82. Defendant did not hesitate to inform the probation 
officers about the cocaine under the stairs or to give them the 
key to the closet where he had hidden it. Cf. State v. Thurman. 
846 P.2d at 1273 (Thurman voluntarily consented to the subsequent 
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search where he opened the combination lock to the storage unit 
searched). Finally, the probation officers had, by this time, 
given defendant his Miranda warnings and consequently informed 
defendant that he did not have to speak to them or, implicitly, 
cooperate with them. CJL. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1273 
(Thurman given a second Miranda warning before consenting to 
search of storage unit). 
Moreover, the subsequent consent to search the closet was 
sufficiently attenuated from the prior searches that any 
illegality in those searches did not taint the subsequent 
consent. Determining at what point sufficient attenuation exists 
requires balancing the need for deterring police misconduct 
against the cost to society of excluding relevant evidence. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1272. In turn, this requires 
^balancing the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against 
the time and circumstances that intervene before consent is 
given. The nature and degree of the illegality will usually be 
inversely related to the effectiveness of time and intervening 
events to dissipate the presumed taint. Where misconduct is 
extreme, [the courts] require a clean break in the chain of 
events . . • ." Id. at 1264. 
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Although close in time and circumstance, the subsequent 
search of the basement closet was nevertheless sufficiently 
attenuated from the prior searches to remove any taint. As 
argued in Point I, the probation officers conducted the initial 
searches only after they believed they had obtained defendant's 
consent to do so. Any initial illegality was not flagrant or 
intentional; to the contrary, the probation officers believed 
they had complied with what the Fourth Amendment required of them 
before they could legally search. Compare State Y. Thurmaft/ 846 
P.2d at 1273 (officers intentionally entered Thurman's home 
illegally in a way "calculated to cause at least surprise, if not 
confusion and fright") (citations omitted). Therefore, no clean 
break between any initial illegality and the second consent is 
required. Similarly, suppressing the evidence would do little to 
deter future police misconduct. 
Based on the above, the minimal, if any, benefit of 
suppressing the cocaine does not justify the cost to society of 
depriving the fact finder of relevant evidence. Therefore, 
defendant's voluntary, second consent supports the trial court's 
decision not to suppress the cocaine seized. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendants conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument in this case because the 
issues depend heavily on the facts and implicate many possible 
analytical approaches. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _7 d aY o f -JfoA 
1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/],Qsur*-£\ 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 6 
(5) The Supreme Ckmrt has sole discreti^ 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3) (b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1963, 78-S4, enacted by L. 
10S6, eh. 47,1 41; 1987. eh. 161,1 SOS; 1S8S. 
ch .S4S , | 5;19S9,ch-S7,| 1; 19W, ch-117, 
I 11; 1994, ch. 191,1 t; 1996, eh. 9S7,1 6; 
1996, eh. 199,1 46. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, in Subsection (4), 
deleted former Subsection! (e) end (f), which 
feed: 'general water abjudication* end taxa-
tion end revenue; end," respectively, making 
related changes; redesignated former Subsec-
tion (g) es Subsection (e); end made stylistic 
changes in Subsection (e). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
edded Subsections (SXk) end (4Xe), making 
related changes. 
The 1995 amendments by ch- 267 end ch. 
199, both effective May 1,1996, made the same 
changes: they changed "Board of State Lends 
end Forestry" to •School and Institutional Trust 
Lends Board of Trustees" in Subeection 
(SXeXiii) and edded Subeection (SXeXvi). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AKALTSW 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
—Attachment 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Certiorari 
Original jurisdiction. 
—Extraordinary writs. 
Cited. 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
—Attachment. 
Although this section did not govern a land 
conveyance because it was not in effect when 
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section 
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition foi review 
was filed. National Parks 6 Conservation Aaa*n 
•. Board of State Lends, 869 R2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Subdivision OXeXiii) confers jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and 
decpses that originate in formal adjudicative 
proeffcdings in agency actions. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 R2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
Certiorari. 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefi of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Original jurisdiction. 
—Extraordinary write. 
The term •original* in Subeection (2) adds 
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdic-
tion — and its absence in < 78-2a-3(l) takes 
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions 
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a 
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition origi-
nally filed with it as opposed to its appellate 
jurisdiction aw cases that originated else-
where. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 R2d 679 (Utah 
CtApp.1994). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue aUextxacn i^inary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
7 COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
(a) to cany into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over. 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review at 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C 1963, 78-2a«3, enacted by L. 
1886, ch. 47,1 46; 1987, ch. 161,1 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, I If 1988, ch. 810,1 141; 1988, eh. 
848,1 8; 1990, ch. 80,1 5; 1990, ch. 884,1 3; 
1991,ch.988,| 88; 1998,eh. 187,1 18; 1994, 
ch. 13,1 46; 1996, ch. 899,1 47. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2Xh) through (J) es Subsections (2)0) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted 'Board of Pardon* and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in 8ubeection (2Xh) and 
inserted 'Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1996, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2Xa). 
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existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within 
the specific chemical designation; as used in this Subsection (iii) only, 
"isomer" includes the optical, position, and geometric isomers: 
(A) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine; 
(B) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine; 
(C) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine; 
CD) 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine (MDMA); 
(E) 5-i9ethoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine; 
(F) 4-methoxyamphetamine; 
(G) 3,4,6-trimethozy amphetamine; 
(H) Bufotenine; 
(I) Diethyltzyptamine; 
(J) Dimethyltryptamine; 
(K) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine; 
(L) Ibogaine; 
(M) Lysergic acid diethylamide; 
(N) Marijuana; 
(0) Mescaline; 
(P) Parahexyl; 
(Q) Peyote; 
(R) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate; 
(S) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate; 
(T) Psilocybin; 
(U) Psilocyn; 
(V) Tetrahydrocannabinols; 
(W) Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine; 
(X) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine; 
(Y) 1-W2-Thieny) Cydohexyl Pyrrolidine; and 
(Z) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Mecloqualone; and 
(B) Methaqualone. 
(v) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system, including their salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers: 
(A) Fenethylline; 
(B) 4-Methylaminorex; and 
(C) N-ethylamphetamine, 
(b) Schedule II: 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any of the following substances whether produced directly or indi-
rectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(A) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation of opium or opiate, excluding apomorphine, 
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dextrorphan, nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their 
respective salts, but including: 
(I) Raw opium; 
(II) Opium extracts; 
(HI) Opium fluid extracts; 
(IV) Powdered opium; 
(V) Granulated opium; 
(VI) Tincture of opium; 
(VII) Codeine; 
(Vm) Ethylmorphine; 
(IX) Etorphine hydrochloride; 
(X) Hydrocodone; 
GQ) Hydromorphone; 
(XII) Metopon; 
(Xm) Morphine; 
(XIV) Oxycodone; 
(XV) Oxymorphone; and 
(XVI) Thebaine; 
(B) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation which is 
chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances 
referred to in Subsection (2XbXiXA), except that these substances 
may not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium; 
(C) Opium poppy and poppy straw; 
(D) Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or prepa-
ration of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation which is chemically equivalent or identical with any 
of these substances, and includes cocaine, its isomers and salts of 
isomers, whether derived from the coca plant or synthetically 
produced, except the substances may not include decocainized 
coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not 
contain cocaine or ecgonine; and 
(E) Concentrate of poppy straw, which means the crude extract 
of poppy straw in either liquid, solid, or powder form which 
contains the phenanthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy. 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, when the 
existence of the isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the 
specific chemical designation, except dextrorphan: 
(A) Alphaprodine; 
(B) Alfentanil; 
(C) Anileridine; 
(D) Bezitramide; 
(E) Bulk dextropropoxyphene (nondosage forms); 
(F) Carfentanil; 
(G) Dihydrocodeine; 
(H) Diphenoxylate; 
(I) Fentanyl; 
(J) Isomethadone; 
(K) Levomethorphan; 
(L) Levorphanol; 
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(M) Metazotine; 
(N) Methadone; 
(O) Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 
4-diphenyl butane; 
(P) Methyl-Fentanyl; 
(Q) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholinol, 1-di-
phenylpropane-carbozylic acid; 
(R) Pethidine (meperidine); 
(5) Pethidine-Intermediate-A, 4<yano-l-methyl-4-phenylpi-
peridine; 
(T) Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-car-
boxylate; 
(U) Pethidine-Intermediate-C, l-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-
carboxylic acid; 
(V) Phenazocine; 
(W) Piminodine; 
(X) Racemethorphan; 
(Y) Racemorphan; and 
(Z) Sufentanil, 
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system: 
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its 
optical isomers; 
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its 
isomers; 
(C) Phenmetrazine and its salts; and 
(D) Methylphenidate. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers 
is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Amobarbital; 
(B) N,NJMmethylamphetamine; 
(C) Glutethimide; 
(D) Pentobarbital; 
(E) Phencyclidine; 
(F) Phencyclidine immediate precursors: l-phenyl-cyclohexyl-
amine and 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC); and 
(6) Secobarbital. 
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances: 
(A) immediate precursor to amphetamine and methamphet-
amine; 
(I) Phenylacetone. 
Some of these substances may be known by trade or other names: 
phenyl-2-propanone, P2P; benzyl methyl ketone, methyl benzyl ke-
tone. 
230 
soft gelatin capsule in a Fulnal Food and Drug Administration 
approved drug product; and 
(B) NabinoL 
(c) Schedule III: 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, 
any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any 
quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the 
central nervous system, including its salts, isomers whether optical, 
position, or geometric, and salts of the isomers when the existence of 
the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific 
chemical designation: 
(A) Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage unit 
form containing any stimulant substances listed in Schedule n, 
which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed on 
August 25,1971, as excepted compounds under Section 308.32 of 
Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and any other drug of 
the quantitive composition shown in that list for those drugs or 
which is the same except that it contains a lesser quantity of 
controlled substances; 
(B) Benzphetamine; 
(C) Chlorphentermine; 
(D) Clortermine; 
(E) Manndol; and 
(F) Fhendimetrazine. 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on 
the central nervous system: 
(A) Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing amo-
barbital, secobarbital, pentobarbital, or any salt of any of them, 
and one or more other active medicinal ingredients which are not 
listed in any schedule; 
(B) Any suppository dosage form containing amobarbital, seco-
barbital, or pentobarbital, or any salt of any of these drugs which 
is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for marketing 
only as a suppository; 
(C) Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative 
of barbituric acid or any salt of any of them; 
CD) Chorhexadol; 
(E) Lysergic acid; 
(F) Lysergic acid amide; 
(G) Methypiylon; 
(H) Sulfondiethylmethane; 
(I) Sulfonethylmethane; 
(J) Sulfonmethane; and 
(K) TQetamine and zolazepam or any of their salts, 
(iii) Nalorphine. 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing 
limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts 
of any of them: 
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veterinarian may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was 
delivered to him by the person selling or dispensing it. 
History: I* 1971, cfc. 145,1 7; 1966, ch. IS, Federal Law. — Section 305 of the Federal 
I & Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Meaning of "this act* — The term this Control Act of 1970, referred to in Subsection 
act," in Subsection (1), means Laws 1971, ch. (l), U 21 U.S.C. f 625. 
146, H 1 *o 22, which enacted this chapter. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule in or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; • 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
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chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Xb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
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(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(8) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter, 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (SXa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
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trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized Under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5Xa)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5Xa)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to comznit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
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(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu o£ any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to H the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
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(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History:L. 1971,ch. 145,1 8;1972,ch.22, | l;1977 fch.29,i6$1979 fch.lM 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, | 1; 1986, ch. 196,1 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
I 100; 1987, ch. 190,1 S; 1988, ch. 95, I 1; 
1989, ch. 50,1 2; 1989, ch. 66,1 1; 1989, ch. 
178,1 1; 1989, ch. 187,1 9; 1989, ch. 901, t 1; 
1990, ch. 161,1 1; 1990, ch. 163,1 2; 1990, 
ch. 168,1 8; 1991, ch. 80, i 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
i 4; 1991, ch. 168,1 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, in-
serted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving 
any controlled substance from another source" 
in Subsection UXaXii) and corrected two refer-
ence errors in Subsection (13). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ( 2, effec-
tive from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990, 
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9Xa) 
and (13Xb). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, § 3, effec-
tive Jury 1,1990, substituted "Section 77*18-1" 
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure* 
in Subsection (9Xa). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5Xa), inserted 
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection 
Gi) as (iii), substituted "or institution under 
Subsections (SXaXi) and CUT for "under Subsec-
tion (SXaXir in Subsection (iii), inserted Sub-
sections (rv) through (viii), redesignated former 
Subsections (iii) and (rv) as (ix) and (x), and 
substituted "Subsections (SXaXi) through (viif 
for 'Subsection (5XsXi) or (uT in Subsection 
(ix); substituted "Chapter 87a, Title 58, Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter 37b, Title 
58, Imitation Controlled Substances Act" for 
'Chapters 37s or 37b, Title 58" in Subsection 
(lSXs); and added Subsection (14) (appearing 
as Subsection (13) after January 1,1992). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the present 
language after "Schedules II through V" in 
Subsection (lXsXiii) for "under an order or 
prescription," and made stylistic changes in the 
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5Xa). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effective 
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsection 
(13), imposing s fee of $150 against each person 
convicted of, and each juvenile found within the 
court's jurisdiction because of, committing an 
offense and providing for the use of funds 
generated by the foe. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Croes-Reference*.-- Cities and towns, pro-
hibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, } 10-
8-47. 
Psychotoxic chemical solvents, penalties for 
use or sale, ( 76-10-101 et seq. 
Sentencing for felonies, ({ 76-3-201, 76-3-
203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, M 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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DAVID EYOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTHMcCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake Chy, Utah 84111 
Phone:(801)363-7900 
By. 
b~> 
CierK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
GORDON RAY HAM, 
Defendant. 
) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
) 
) CaseNo.941901494FS 
) 
) Honorable DAVID S.YOUNG 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence having come before this Court for a hearing on 
November 17,1994, and the Court having considered the pleadings and other documents filed with the 
Court, having considered the testimony of officers McCullough and Hillam and the defendant, having 
considered the arguments of counsel, and otherwise being fully advised regarding the matter before it 
the Court now enters its FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant, Gordon Ray Ham, is presently and was on October 13,1994, on probation 
based on his conviction for a felony related to sexual conduct. Pursuant to being placed on probation 
the defendant executed a probation agreement whereby he agreed, inter alia, to not use or possess 
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alcohol or any controlled substance, to allow probation oflBcers to visit his residence to ensure his 
compliance with his conditions of probation, and to allow probation oflBcers to search his residence or 
property under his control if the oflBcers reasonably suspect a violation of probation. 
2. On October 13,1994, agents Scott McCuUough and Craig Hillam of Adult Probation and 
Parole went to the defendant's residence at 8625 South 150 West in Midvale, Utah, to conduct a 
routine "home visit." 
3. At the onset of this home visit, Agent McCuUough informed the defendant that he wished to 
ensure the defendant's compliance with his "no alcohol" probation condition and stated words to the 
effect "We need to look in the refrigerator for alcohol" to which the defendant replied words to the 
effect "Go ahead" (in any event the defendant did not state any objection). Agent McCuIIough did not 
find alcohol in the refrigerator, but Agent Hillam, who looked into an adjacent freezer, did locate two 
bottles of alcohol. This alcohol was seized, but then disposed of in the kitchen drain. 
4. After the initial discovery of contraband alcohol, the defendant was instructed by Agent 
McCuIIough to escort the oflBcers in a cursory "walk through" of the residence to look for other 
evidence of the defendant's alcohol use. When the agents were led into the basement-where the 
defendant had been before meeting the agents at the front door-a cooler was found in the center of the 
room filled with ice and 14 cans of beer. As Agent McCuUough secured the cooler, Agent Hillam 
looked into an adjacent room, and after illuminating the room by turning a bulb in its socket, he saw a 
mirror in plain view which had a white powdery substance on it along with drug paraphernalia 
including razor blades and a straw. Based on his training and experience Agent Hillam believed the 
substance was cocaine and therefore arrested the defendant. 
5. After the defendant was placed in custody and restrained with handcuffs, but before he was 
provided his Miranda warning, the defendant was subjected to brief interrogation. In response to 
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questioning he admitted that the substance was cocaine and belonged to him, and he also told Agent 
Hillam that "mushrooms" would be found in a jar on a shelf in the room where the cocaine was 
discovered. 
6. During a delay while the agents awaited backup, the defendant and a guest were secured for 
officers' safety and efforts to search the residence were suspended. Before any other officers arrived, 
the defendant was provided his Miranda warning and he agreed to speak without the presence of an 
attorney. During subsequent interrogation he restated that the cocaine found on the mirror was his, 
and he directed Agent McCuUough to discover more cocaine located in locked chest that was bolted to 
the floor under the stairway. 
7. In the absence of admissions by the defendant, the probation officers would have thoroughly 
searched the residence for additional contraband after finding the defendant in violation of his probation 
by possessing the cocaine found in plain view during the "walk through." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The search of the freezer which revealed the two bottles of liquor was a lawful reasonable 
search because the defendant agreed in the probation agreement he signed to allow probation officers 
to search his residence for evidence of violations of probation, and because the defendant consented to 
a search of his refrigerator, and by implication, his freezer. 
2. Once the liquor was discovered, the probation officers had a "reasonable suspicion" to 
conduct a more intrusive search of the house pursuant to State v. Valesquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 
1983). 
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3. The additional discovery of the beer in the cooler in the downstairs of the house further 
supported a "reasonable suspicion" justifying the scope of the search which led to the discovery of the 
defendant's possession of cocaine. 
4. After his arrest, the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of 
Miranda, but the evidence that was found subsequent to the defendant's arrest is not subject to 
suppression because its discovery was inevitable in that the probation officers would have conducted 
the search of the residence even had the defendant not made any statements. St* Nix v. Williams. 467 
U.S. 431,104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984). 
ORDER 
Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, it is HEREBY 
ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is 
DENIED. 
DATED this b day o£Jjaeeffitter, 
THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
)MON CHACON 
'Counsel for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was delivered to Solomon 
Chacon, counsel for defendant, by mailing it to 124 South 400 East, Suite 320, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this ^ P day of December, 1994. 
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